walkitout: (Default)
People do this. I KNOW! WHY???? Two reasons: the amount they want to borrow is too high even for a jumbo, or at least a jumbo that they can find (or, see below: there is a benefit for being able to access the money faster than a conventional loan). Or because they can't _get_ a mortgage because they can't show enough income to satisfy current loan requirements.

What's a margin loan? Well, let's say you have an investment portfolio that you have been shoveling all the money that you save into over a period of years/decades (and it's not a 401K or IRA or Roth IRA or whatever, either because you don't qualify for one of those or you've maxed it out or whatever). In that portfolio is a bunch of stocks, funds, bonds, etc. You've carefully crafted a diverse set of investments over time (or you are holding a huge amount of stock in a company that you helped found/work for) and you don't want to (can't because of special insider trading rules that apply to you) sell the underlying stocks, funds, bonds, etc. Nevertheless, even tho you (a) don't have the cash, (b) can't or don't care to borrow the money in the form of a mortgage against the house (see first paragraph) or (c) can't or don't care to sell assets to generate the cash, you still want to buy a (ludicrously expensive) piece of real estate.

The firm you have the assets at is often willing to loan you money _against_ those assets, in exchange for (a) interest and (b) the right to sell those assets and take the money back that way. So instead of borrowing from a bank that can take your house, you are borrowing from an investment company that can take your ... investments. And generally, the scenario under which they would sell your investments to get their money back is ... in the middle of a crash, when they are worth A Lot Less.

Margin loans for real estate are a terrible idea, because they let people spend insane amounts of money -- after all, this tends to happen when stock portfolios are super plump and people are reluctant to sell because, I dunno, no one wants to sell at or near the peak? they always think it's gonna go higher, and it will, until it doesn't -- running up the price on real estate. And then the assets guaranteeing the loan ... shrivel, and are sold at a loss (either by the "owner" or the other owner, that is, whoever you borrowed the money from), thus making an already expensive decision to buy that real estate even more expensive (to be fair, selling the underlying asset to buy the real estate can have the exact same effect, minus some of the drama).

I know, it's terribly funny because it only happens to people who (a) have a lot of money and (b) are stupid. But it is actually a serious problem in a ton of ways, because this is a bubble. And it is really happening. And it will tend to encourage people to want interest rates to rise to slow down the bubble, AND THAT WILL GUARANTEE YOU NEVER GET A RAISE EVER AGAIN (or more hours or a job at all). While you are busy laughing at stupid rich people, crudely managing their stupidity may result in a whole lot of unavoidable pain for everyone else. Let's not do this.

The first step in Not Doing This is understanding that it is happening, talking about it so we all understand it, and then crafting tools to discourage or eliminate the behavior. We are Not There Yet, because this is the quality of advice out there about margin loans and real estate. Is it opposed to the practice? Yes, yes it is. Is it cogent and concise? Not at all.

http://www.bankrate.com/finance/mortgages/margin-loan-or-mortgage-to-buy-a-home.aspx

The argument here is basically, "it's too risky". And if the person whose broker is trying to get them to use a margin loan to buy a house takes "it's too risky" back to the broker, the broker is JUST GOING TO TALK FASTER. And then the idiot will be an idiot. Which may turn out fine, but probably not.

"Margin loans are variable-rate loans. The interest rate will vary among brokers. A quick review of current rates finds great variation. A 15- or 30-year fixed-rate mortgage appears to be a bargain compared with what some brokerage firms charge. Are you willing to move your account to get the lowest margin loan rate?

There are plenty of other risks if using margin to finance your home. Aside from interest rate risk, you face the possibility of a margin call if the value of your investments declines."

Other coverage of margin loans to buy real estate, scary to think this is, in part, what is driving the California real estate market this go-round:

http://www.marketwatch.com/story/using-a-margin-loan-to-buy-a-house-2013-07-25

At least _they_ point out that margin call risk is huge and that some people are just using the margin loan to win a bidding war for a house, and will then line up more traditional financing later. But horrifying, that this has become so normal in the last couple years, and this article is mostly about how to do it better, rather than about how it needs to stop.
walkitout: (Default)
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/07/opinion/jobs-and-the-federal-reserve.html?_r=0

The NYT could have taken the easy path and said, hey, we're not above 2% yet, let's wait until we are. We're at the high end of the current belief system about NAIRU, wait until we're at the bottom. But they did not! They reminded everyone about the dual mandate, and then they went a little further.

"The reason the Fed associates falling unemployment with rising inflation is that, theoretically, more hiring leads to higher wages that, in turn, lead to consumer demand for goods and services, pushing up prices.

In practice, it has been several decades since those relationships have held — in part, because the Fed has usually been too quick to raise rates when wages have started to rise. This has led to a long-term decline in the share of income that goes to worker pay and a long-term increase in the share that goes to stockholders and executives."

They are reminding everyone of the theoretical core of NAIRU and pointing out that if you spike that phenomenon as comprehensively as we have in recent decades, you generate wealth inequality, and that is the current problem. So, yay! Concise and cogent!

But what about that asset bubble on the high end?

"In the meantime, it should use its regulatory tools to ensure that low-interest-rate credit is put to productive uses and not speculative bubbles."

Here's my suggestion: see if you can discourage people from taking margin loans to buy expensive property. Make them actually _sell_ the underlying asset, rather than just borrow against it. That should reduce the bubbliciousness at the high end.

The piece concludes with a swipe at Congress. Because, Congress.
walkitout: (Default)
I don't honestly think NAIRU current "actual" value is what's driving any decision making at the Fed. I think it's more about seasonality, asymmetrical risks and the difficulty of predicting what the next few months of oil prices will be and the implications of that for the economy in general. Oh, and that employment index thingie that isn't "unemployment", but captures people who want more hours and can't get them (U6, IIRC). That's probably driving a lot of thinking over at the Fed. [ETA: and what's going on in Europe, internationally generally . . .]

Anyway. Just in case NAIRU is a factor, Krugman is going to make absolutely certain that everyone knows about how it isn't 5.x% now or at various points in the past. And good for him! Hopefully people are reading and paying attention.

http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/03/07/remembrance-of-nairus-past/
walkitout: (Default)
Ya know, just walk away. I know I can't, but hopefully you have more self-control and sense than I do.

h/t Calculated Risk, quoting another blogger, Tim Duy, on the topic of some of the language used by the Federal Reserve to set market expectations for how the Fed might adjust the interest rate at which it loans money out ("Fed Funds Rate", currently .25% or 25 basis points).

http://www.calculatedriskblog.com/2015/03/duy-patient-is-history.html

For some years now, the Fed has said that it was gonna keep that rate real low for quite a while, and it has used some different language to convey that but recently, the key word was "patient". A little background. The Fed has _two_ _equal_ mandates. It has _two_ priorities. It has _two_ goals. One goal is price stability: prices are not supposed to rise (inflation) or fall (deflation -- I know you think falling prices are Teh Awesome, but when they happen, you are all freaking out with the rest of us, you've just blotted the memory out because it was So So Painful). The other goal is full employment. Once upon a time, it was believed that full employment meant basically every man had a job. Then some stuff happened and some other stuff happened, and now we have this theory abbreviated NAIRU, which is basically if every man or woman who recently had a job still has a job (that is, no recently employed person is currently looking for work), then wages rise and prices rise and wages rise faster and prices rise faster and That Is Not Good So Don't Let That Happen make sure there are always a few people looking for work. The actual fraction of people recently employed who should not be currently employed but still looking is subject to some debate, but it's around 5%.

Currently, the not-seasonally adjusted CPI-U for all cities in the US ex food and fuel as of January 2015 is .2%. The year-over-year not seasonally adjusted CPI-U is 1.6%. Just like we don't want everyone to have a job (cause that makes for inflation), we don't want to have zero inflation (because it can tip over negative and we're back into that thing you blotted out because it was So So Painful). The current target for inflation is 2%, which means that even year over year inflation is Too Fucking Low. But getting close. HOWEVER we are in the middle of a ginormous crash in the price of fuel and the result is that we are actually experiencing deflation right now in the headline number. Yes, you heard me, and you are actually happy about it because you can take all those $20 you used to pour into your gas tank and go spend them at Applebee's instead.

For CPI-U numbers go here: http://www.bls.gov/cpi/

So Tim Duy thinks that the Fed will remove "patient" from the language but not immediately raise rates. Other people are thinking RAISE RATES NOW NOW NOW and their argument is, when it is not totally crazy, fairly simple: we are experiencing asset inflation not captured by CPI-U. Basically, all the super yachts and art objects and condos in Manhattan and similar have gotten Way Too Expensive, because stock prices are up all over and people are borrowing against their portfolio to buy real estate and that just sucks for all the people who were hoping to get the same thing for less. That's _the sane_ argument for raising rates (doesn't sound sane? You may be on to something there).

Predictably, Krugman has a column out about asymmetrical effects of raising rates.

http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/03/06/the-nairu-straitjacket-and-cromwells-rule/

Notably, he says something NICE about Greenspan (I know -- I was a little surprised, too):

"Circa 1994 it was widely believed, based on seemingly solid research, that the NAIRU was around 6 percent; but Greenspan and company decided to wait for actual evidence of rising inflation, and the result was a long run of job growth that brought unemployment below 4 percent without any kind of inflationary explosion."

Here's what I'm thinking. Don't do it in June, because everyone will be about to head out on vacation, so they'll make the absolutely most conservative decision possible and the economy will stall the fuck out. But if you do it in September or later, then you'll be raising a lousy 25 bp into the Christmas season and even if you cock it up completely, it'll probably be okay and you can undo it in January. And if we needed to do that, then it'll be great, and you can raise again early in 2016.

Also, I'd wait until after we top up all the storage to see what happens to oil prices when no one is buying that stuff to store it for later. Because that could be a wild ride for a bit there.

http://247wallst.com/energy-economy/2015/03/05/is-a-crude-oil-super-contango-in-our-future/

[ETA: Cushing to fill by end of May: http://www.argusmedia.com/News/Article?id=1001222]

It is not worth arguing this much about 25 bp. This is the most anticipated rate rise In the History of the Federal Reserve. It is going to be okay.

[Two more things to point out. While currently low gas prices have the simultaneously scary effect of pushing us into headline deflation and the simultaneously lovely effect of giving ordinary people extra money to spend on something they've been wanting for some time now, at some point fuel prices -- and food with them -- will rise once again. And then they won't have that extra money and the economy has a whole will Really Feel the Pinch, if we treated that extra spending as "inflation" inducing -- ha! -- and discouraged it. Second thing: the European Union is finally being sensible and trying to crawl out of what looks like the beginnings of another recession. We could help them a bit by allowing the Euro to continue to weaken and the dollar to strengthen, compatible with a 25 bp rise by the Fed. I think. Unless I got it backward, again.]

[USA Today's commentary seems to be leaning towards September. http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2015/03/06/investing-a-sea-change/24454215/]
walkitout: (Default)
I'm a bit concerned that BI is going to fix this, so I'm gonna just copy the way it is right now:

Title: Here's where the world's ultra-rich are moving — and where they are coming from

Read more: http://www.businessinsider.com/which-countries-the-ultra-rich-move-to-2015-3

"The world's ultra-rich are on the move.

In its 2015 Wealth Report, real estate consultancy Knight Frank took a look at the migration flows of the world's so-called high-net-worth-individuals (HNWIs) from 2003 to 2013.

As a destination, the UK far outpaced every other country, with more than 114,000 HNWIs migrating there during the 10-year period. (HNWIs are defined as having at least $30 million in assets.)

The US came in third place with 42,000 ultra-rich immigrants.

Note, the total number of HNWIs in the US (4 million in 2013) is still higher than the total in the UK (815,000 in 2013).

So where did the majority of those people come from?

Asia, mostly. About 76,000 HNWIs left China throughout the decade, while more than 43,000 took left India. According to the report, Singapore has been a popular destination for many of those emigrants."

What has happened here is pretty simple: Crowe has confused the UHNWI, of which there are only a few tens of thousands in the world [ETA: under 200K would probably be a more fair way to characterize this group. It's more than a "few tens of thousands". My bad.], with the HNWI, of which there are millions. She is using the _wealth minimum_ for UHNWI and the _total population_ of HNWI. This is actually pretty fucking awesome in so many ways, but mostly because it is practically designed to induce feelings of inadequacy (at the very least) and potentially a nervous breakdown (probably not) in the typical BI reader, who, judging by the articles anyway, is obsessively trying to figure out how to get richer, trying to understand who the super-rich are, and ranking themselves accordingly.

You can tell that there is _some_ sort of confusion, otherwise, the conclusion would be that there are as many people in the US with more than $30 million in assets as there are babies born every year. Another way to think about 4 million HNWI where HNWI = $30 million (<-- remember, this is a mistake! HNWI is only a million; UHNWI are $30 million) is that in order to be in the top 1% by wealth in the United States, you have to have _more than_ $30 million dollars. And we know that all of that is just kinda loony tunes. (Altho if it _were_ true, then soaking the top 1% for tax revenue would actually fix all of our problems. But it ain't true! Gosh durn it all.)

Her source is here:

http://www.knightfrank.com/wealthreport/2015/wealth-distribution/

"The global population of ultra-high-net-worth individuals, grew by almost 5,200 last year, according to data prepared exclusively for The Wealth Report by the analyst firm WealthInsight.

This latest increase means 65,000 people have joined the ranks of the ultra-wealthy over the past decade – arise of 61%. In total, there are now 172,850 individuals in this cohort who hold wealth totalling $20.8tr, an increase of $700bn during 2014."

If my math is correct (and it probably isn't), those 172K individuals average 120 million. Which means precisely nothing.

I'm still digging around in the underlying research trying to figure out how this particular error happened in the first place.

Update 1: More about the error!

http://luxurysociety.com/articles/2014/03/5-key-insights-from-the-2014-wealth-report-by-knight-frank

The main article here has it right, but on the bottom right there is a little section that has the same error (HNWI defined as $30 million, which is of course the UHNWI definition).

"The Wealth Report is Knight Frank’s annual publication covering wealth creation, the spending habits of HNWIs (defined as those with net assets of over $30m), prime property markets around the globe, the world’s most important cities, and the attitudes of the wealthy towards investment and their homes .

This year’s Report includes contributions from Wealth-X, Ledbury Research, The Economist Intelligence Unit and Real Capital Analytics, as well as Knight Frank’s research teams.

knightfrank.com/wealthreport"

Update 2:

Even Knight Frank can't keep it straight!!!

http://www.knightfrank.com/news/world%E2%80%99s-wealthy-set-to-grow-by-50-in-the-next-decade-01615.aspx

"The global number of High-Net-Worth Individuals (HNWIs is defined as someone with $30 million or more in net assets) increased by almost 8,700, or 5%, in 2012"

Update 3:

I explored the possibility that Knight Frank redefined HNWI. I think they did not.

http://www.knightfrank.co.uk/news/first-ever-knight-frank-prime-global-cities-index-q1-2011-results-0626.aspx

I would think it would be easier than this to keep straight the difference between $1 million in assets and $30 million in assets. It is not difficult to tell the difference between a penny and a quarter plus a nickel. It is not difficult to tell a $1 from a twenty and a ten. It is not difficult to tell three c-notes from a ten dollar bill. Etc. It is _even_ possible to notice the difference between a million dollar home and a thirty million dollar ... something or other. I know, a single letter difference introduces copy editing errors. But copy editing errors doesn't seem to be what we have going on, at least not by the time it got to BI.
walkitout: (Default)
http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/03/03/how-negative-can-rates-go/

He observes that (a) interest rates can and do go negative, (b) storing physical currency turns out to be startlingly expensive and therefore (c) people are gonna just let the cash stack up in their checking or whatever account. My words, but that's what I understand him to be saying.

"Once interest rates on safe assets are zero or lower, however, liquidity has no opportunity cost ... [which means] ... that the marginal dollar of money holdings is being held solely as a store of value — the medium of exchange utility is irrelevant."

Back in the Bad Old Days of inflation and being able to put your money into a money market fund and earn interest (or a CD or whatever), people would limit the amount of money sitting in non-interest bearing accounts, and transfer it over to an interest bearing account so as to make some money off their money. From a policy perspective, this is a good thing, because the money sitting in checking and most savings accounts has severe limitations on how it can be invested by the bank, so it sits idle. Once it is in a CD or a money fund or stocks or bonds or whatever, there are a lot fewer limits -- that money can go out in the world and circulate, hopefully usefully. Now, there's just little point in taking the money out of the checking or whatever account, because what you have to do to make money off of it is so risky for most people that it is intolerable.

"And I am pinching myself at the realization that this seemingly whimsical and arcane discussion is turning out to have real policy significance."

I don't quite understand why he thought this was whimsical or arcane, but hey, I bought gold in 1997-8 time frame out of some concerns about the possible future, so I really get storage costs and medium of exchange and wtfery. Clearly, by being a Normal Person (for these purposes, that just means less crazy than me), he had not yet worked through the implications.

ETA:

http://www.businessinsider.com/credit-suisse-on-contango-oil-prices-2015-3

Article about super-contango, and the current theory that oil prices will do something Really Interesting when we run out of places to store the oil (that is, one of the things supporting oil prices at the moment is people going, hey, oil is cheap now but futures are more expensive so if I buy it and store it, I'll make money -- but of course, _buying_ it to store it supports the price. Hrm.).

I put this on the Krugman liquidity trip post, because, you know, currency is liquid in a metaphorical sense, but oil is liquid in a not so metaphorical sense and being in contango with storage filling up suggests that there is a really good joke here about liquidity traps and oil, I'm just not actually clever enough to make it. Or at least, not clever enough to make it without then having to explain the thing after, crushing every last bit of humor present in it.

So, you know me: just start with the explanation.
walkitout: (Default)
Having been through a few economic downturns of various magnitudes, and upturns as well, I have noticed qualitatively different fast food service during downturns vs upturns. The magnitude of the qualitative effect is so substantial that the worst fast food service I have experienced some months into a significant downturn is better than the good fast service (altho not the very best fast food service) near the top of the peak of the upturn. My explanation for this is that many, many good workers are laid off during a significant downturn through no particular fault of their own. They are energetic, motivated, cheerful, intelligent, organized thinkers with strong bodies and good motor and interpersonal skills. Put them at the drive through or the counter or in the kitchen and it is a freaking miracle. At some point, as the economy improves, they will abandon their job at the fast food place in favor of better remunerated work more compatible with their education and experience. The longer the economic doldrums, the more likely the management the store will be composed exclusively of this group of people which will exacerbate what happens next.

As the energetic, motivated, cheerful, intelligent, organized thinkers with strong bodies and good motor and interpersonal skills depart for better pay sitting down without fry oil in the air, they are replaced by people who are less well endowed in one or more of those areas. If management is not exclusively composed of the temporary residents of fast food -- that is, if someone involved is going to be doing this For Ever -- then management will be careful to make sure that they are replaced by people who bring things to the store that the departing lacked: loyalty, patience, an inability or unwillingness to produce or be entertained by sarcasm, schadenfreude, pranks, etc. If those attributes are accompanied by difficulty making change, a lack of eye contact with the customer, fine motor skills deficits, etc., well, at least they won't leave right away. A store that is exceptional at finding these workers can provide decent customer service throughout an upturn.

There's the background. There are some automation issues -- you can compensate for a lot of unevenness in employee ability over the course of the economic cycle with automation. Simple things like buttons on machines that dispense sugar or condiments, or the scoop to fill the fry packet or the salt dispenser or whatever. But if the automation is at all complex, it, too, can flummox the worker because the learning curve can get pretty bad. Even if you have a button for every menu item, that's a lot of buttons to look at to find the one you want.

Here is my evidence that, at least here in Boston Metrowest, things are picking up. I took both kids over to the Chelmsford BK. It took about a half hour or so each way to get there and back. And I was gone for _2 hours_. There were a few people ahead of us, but not nearly enough to justify the slowdown. I watched the beautiful, lithe, extremely well groomed, patient, sweet and hard working woman be moved from drive through to counter, where it became _painfully_ obvious what was wrong. The register produces two receipts: one for the order picker and one for the customer. She was consistently _losing_ the order picker receipts. Which should not, actually, be possible. They are supposed to be attached to the bag OR the tray, never crumpled and left for dead on the counter. Basically, the customers in line figured out that if they wanted their order, they had to go up, hand her _their_ copy of the order, and then watch her like a hawk as she filled it, because if you took your eyes off her, she'd crumple it, get lost, her lead would distract her and you would _never_ get your food and now you'd have no proof you had ever even ordered, altho the burger pile up got kind of intense.

Someone needed to retrain her in ticket process, or fire her, but I don't think she should be fired, because (a) she never lost her temper and that was a terrifyingly stressful situation for her and everyone else, (b) she was sufficiently appealing personally that anyone -- male, female, old, young -- was going to cut her a ton of extra slack for her slowness and most importantly (c) she was actually a very accurate order taker. Which is not nothing in fast food.

But as badly run as that BK has been, on and off, over the years, this is hands down the worst I've ever seen it (right around the time she was taken off drive through, the lead had to go outside to fix some of the drive through issues). That's not my only example, just the most pronounced one. And that's my evidence that things are going okay, at least around here: the fast food service is really sucking again.

ETA: If you would like to counter with an argument that the economy is still horrible, it's just that a Five Guys opened near this BK and poached the good workers and a lot of the business, I would observe that _a Five Guys opened_ in a new strip mall, and point out that that, all by itself, is evidence of an upturn.

ETAYA: Related data:

http://www.calculatedriskblog.com/2015/03/restaurant-performance-index-shows.html
walkitout: (Default)
Over on my FB feed, a friend asks about the intersection of employer wellness programs that include FitBits, ToS on fitbit, breaks for exercising and other healthy habits and comes up with this question: "could the employers contracting with wellness service use this to determine who gets cheaper premiums?"

And all kinds of questions occur to me.

Expect lots of updates.

http://www.desmoinesregister.com/article/20131201/NEWS/312010065/Insurance-smoking-fee-could-spur-another-vice-Lying-about-doing-it

Insurers aren't necessarily being horrible about the 50% extra they are allowed to charge.

"CoOportunity Health, a new Iowa insurance carrier, is charging 49 percent extra. Cliff Gold, the company’s chief operating officer, said the premiums are justified because of the increased medical costs many tobacco users incur.

Gold noted that tobacco users can avoid the extra premiums by agreeing to participate in tobacco-cessation efforts. For CoOportunity policyholders, that would entail participating online in three 20-minute educational sessions over two months. Participants also would be offered free stop-smoking aids, such as nicotine replacement patches or gum.

“We certainly hope that people will go through with that process,” Gold said.

Tobacco users who participate in the education sessions but fail to kick the habit would qualify for the lower premiums until the beginning of the next year, Gold said. Then, they could either retake the tobacco-cessation classes or pay the higher premium."

A friend had her oxygen saturation checked with a finger clip pulse oximeter on a recent doctor's visit. She misunderstood what was going on and found out what it was for (obvs, as someone who has had two c-sections, I'm way familiar with these things): a cheap and easy way to find out whether someone is a smoker (or chronic, heavy drinker, conceivably):

http://www.masimo.com/pdf/clinical/carboxyhemoglobin/reddy-noninvasive-pulse-co-oximetry-as-a-tool-to-dectect-smoking-oct-2007.pdf

For all of that, however, there are people who think using a pulse oximeter on a smoker who _just_ smoked could be misleadingly high.

http://respiratory-care-sleep-medicine.advanceweb.com/Article/Pulse-Oximetry-User-Beware.aspx

Looks like doctors can _definitely_ tell your insurer that you are a smoker -- so insurers who catch you at this and terminate/raise your rates are already happening presumably.

What about the employer/FitBit question?

https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/20130123054057-258347-fitbit-to-give-employers-your-fitness-report

This guy claims to be pretty blase about privacy stuff and new tech, but he's freaking out about "Fitbit is working with an insurance company to "determine whether individuals who use the mobile devices visit their physicians less than those who do not use the devices."". I don't think he's as blase as he claims. Wouldn't we kind of all want to know this or some similar health proxies (lower blood pressure, better controlled blood sugar, better triglycerides, lower whatever the hell that proxy for inflammation is, etc.)? I mean, isn't that what we _believe_ FitBit does? Wouldn't contrary evidence be kind of important?

Here's a funny one:

http://www.forbes.com/sites/parmyolson/2014/06/19/wearable-tech-health-insurance/

Especially this paragraph, which is about as loony as I have ever read.

"The founders of stickK, a NYC based startup that sells white-label software for corporate-wellness programs, have been trying to talk large U.S. companies into plugging both wearable devices and punitive measure in their wellness plans. These punishments include taking away wellness points if employees don’t reach certain activity targets. It’s a controversial approach, but stickK argues it’s far more effective than offering rewards. (More self-insured employers are already looking at adding $50 surcharges onto the premiums of employees who smoke.)"

This suggests that I am right to believe employers will be wary of this approach. And I find it risible that punitive measures work at all (other than to chase away everyone who can get a job somewhere else -- and believe me, that's not likely to help your company). We've got decades of research on aversives, incentives and environmental change and the most effective stuff is environmental (remove the cigarette vending machines from the lobby and ban smoking in the office), next is incentives and somewhere way, way, way later is aversives. Otherwise moral and ethical people are highly likely to strap their FitBit to a vibrator or the washing machine or the kid -- whatever is necessary to juice their numbers -- if they are subjected to a program as disrespectful as what stickK is proposing.

Wow, this is even better. Derek Newell of Jiff, a "health platform", "Devices that can passively monitor what we eat are also on way, he says."

Seriously? How would that even work? I feel like some of these people played a lot of D&D and don't really understand that when Arthur Clarke said that thing about technology and magic, he meant technology seemed like magic NOT that magic could all shortly be implemented by technology.

Wow. stickK is actually way sillier than I thought.

https://www.stickk.com/faq

So they don't seem to even have a psychologist around to explain to them where they are making their errors. *sigh* Their current focus is on helping people attain goals they have set for themselves (think: volunteer). You can't take the techniques that may work in this context and then apply them to goals Other People Have Set For Them and expect it to work (think: draftee). You aren't actually motivated to cheat (much) if you set the goal. But if someone else set the goal . . .

"And it makes sense. We all start off wanting to achieve our goal, but most of the time there's simply nothing out there to make us stickK to our word. By entering into a Commitment Contract, backing out on that promise just got a whole lot harder. If drinking a can of soda meant you'd have to fork over $10 to your friend, just about anyone would look for something else to drink."

Yah, actually, especially if it wasn't actually our goal, a whole lot of people would sneak the soda and then lie about it. I get that this is a law professor and an econ guy, but do they not remember childhood? Do they not have kids? Who _are_ these people?

Dean Karlan got his MPP and MBA from U Chic, so I think we all know what is going on there. Sure, he got his PhD from MIT in Social Capital and Microfinance so he's not a _horrible_ human, but there are some real blind spots involved here.

Ian Ayres has a picture on his faculty profile page with a classic Ekman half-smile!

http://www.law.yale.edu/faculty/ianayres.htm

Who _does_ that? Somebody who can't be expected to show much respect for anyone else, presumably. (On a _profile_ page? Who puts a contempt smile on their _profile page_?)

That part of me that found really great tricks in NLP wants to like this guy, but that half-smile makes me run in fear. Altho I think this trick actually is pretty awesome:

http://perinealpressure.yale.edu/

I finally found someone who took a look at efficacy that isn't part of this amazingly blinkered little mini-group!

http://www-psych.stanford.edu/~knutson/bad/karlan09.pdf

They aren't very impressed. It mentions this:

Bosch-Capblanch X, Abba K, Prictor M, Garner
2
P. Contracts between patients and healthcare
practitioners for improving patients’ adherence to
treatment, prevention and health promotion activities.
Cochrane Database Syst Rev
2007;(2):CD004804.

So that's a Cochrane review of from 2007. Let's go look for it!

http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/17443556

That's not real enthusiastic. But this one is even more negative:

http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3232314/

Read that one -- it's good.
walkitout: (Default)
http://jezebel.com/why-dont-college-students-give-a-shit-about-sweatshops-1589003079

Lindy West reminisces about boycotting clothing stores in her college years that she couldn't shop at anyway. Why isn't it cool to boycott stuff made in sweatshops anymore? And how come we aren't stopping with the cheap shopping? Weirdly, the answer is in part supplied in the 2013 article on Jezebel by Jenna Sauers linked to at the bottom of this one: labor activists in places like Bangladesh don't _want_ you to stop buying. They want you to apply pressure to their government(s) to improve building codes and enforcement. So hey, West: go read Sauers. Not hard. Boycotts are now counterproductive, and it's not just because organized labor is weak in the USA.

I would also point out several other things that have happened since West's college days.

Mike Daisey conned This American Life -- and then they absolutely shredded him. That, right there, was probably the very, very end of using sweatshop accusations to make people feel bad/change their behavior.

Dov Charney, more recently, lost his job (finally). American Apparel was the Go To source (expensive and with a very limited size range and basically pretty skeezy) for non-sweatshop college fashion. And it turns out that the guy pushing those values might actually have been worse even than he seemed.

Finally, in the years since West was in college, the rest of the countries stable enough to have industries that ship shit to us have finished going through the demographic transition. You'll note that the child deaths associated with the sweatshop in the 2013 article were kids in the day care facility on site for employee use, not children working in the factory. And the adults working in those factories like their jobs better than not having a job, especially if that means going back to rural poverty -- they just don't want to die, so they'd like clean water, building codes, etc. so they Don't Die, which means better governance, not fewer factories.

http://jezebel.com/whats-the-solution-to-the-worlds-sweatshop-problem-511688272

West's nostalgia for the activism of her youth is not entirely novel. But it was jarring. It's always jarring when people who I am pretty sure are substantially younger than me get all nostalgic for something.
walkitout: (Default)
Subtitled: The History of a Dangerous Idea
Published by Oxford University Press

First and foremost, thanks to R. (not my husband or sister) for getting me this for my birthday!

Second, Blyth quotes Tony Judt's _Ill Fares the Land_ favorably/references it in a footnote. Fortunately, while this happened at the very beginning of the book, I sort of didn't really pay any attention to it until the end, so I was able to finish the book and enjoy its many good points.

Here is an earlier post about _Ill Fares the Land_: http://walkitout.livejournal.com/729287.html

As my historian librarian friend I. pointed out at the time, Judt was dying when the book was written and it was completed by someone else. His other work is apparently much better.

Many parts of Blyth's book are excellent. It is a history of ideas; the people are transient and not well developed, so this is in stark contrast to Neil Irwin's _The Alchemists_ (http://walkitout.livejournal.com/1124124.html). Also, while Irwin focused tightly on the most recent downtown, only resorting to earlier history for context, Blyth's story covers a much broader sweep of history.

The biggest complaint -- and it is a serious one -- is that Blyth questions whether we should have saved the banks at all, given the large gap between potential and actual output that occurred anyway. So, first of all, that's scary, because there's a big difference between the total collapse of a nation and its reconstruction in some very unpredictable way and the nation just not doing as much as it could have for a few years. We should all be able to tell the difference. Second, his point of comparison is Iceland. As I was shocked to realize when I was trying to read another book about Iceland (really should go back and try it again), Iceland is tiny. It's smaller than _Cleveland, OH_. I don't think it is a valid basis for comparison, especially in a book where the REBLL countries were dismissed for a variety of reasons, including their small size.

The best thing about this book is that Blyth is prepared to repeatedly and forcefully argue that saving is just as immoral as spending more than you have. This is an important argument to make and remake and hammer on until everyone Gets It. You cannot have a current account surplus without someone else running a current account deficit. Honestly, Blyth's willingness to energetically and imaginatively make this point makes up for every other problem in the book.

Really.
walkitout: (Default)
As I was thinking about wisselruiterij and wechselruiterij [edited: whoops! wechselreiterei? I think?] and bills of accommodation and multiply endorsed checks and other negotiable instruments of varying degrees of reputability, I thought, mortgages!

Just to be clear: mortgages are _not_ negotiable instruments, altho they can be assigned if you do it correctly. So you would think, how could mortgages (or the Promissory Notes associated with them) be thought of in connection with those things I mentioned above? Well, they got securitized and assigned repeatedly in ways that violated the Commercial Code's rules about how the assignment is to be done (legible signatures! Just for starters), and they _behaved_ as if the parties involved (not the poor schmuck who signed the mortgage, mind you, but everyone else from the mortgage broker who sold it to them on up through the investors who bought a hot slice because it was guaranteed later one) all believed it was a negotiable instrument.

So which is it? Is it a negotiable instrument (which is how the financial system treated it as) or not (which the law oh so clearly says)?

It is Not, but the debate about whether it is or is not is interesting and important.

The argument in _favor_ of it being a negotiable instrument (beyond the "everyone else is doing it, mom! argument which I think we all can recognize as a steaming pile of #2, hopefully not human) is that the chain of assignation (<-- almost certainly not the correct term, but wouldn't it be cool if it was!?!) is so unclear for so many properties that if you don't let people who _say_ they hold the note foreclose on it than no one can ever foreclose again on that property and homeowners will strategically default (viz. stop making payments) because they'll know the holder of the note has no recourse. And then no one will ever write a mortgage again because, mess!

That's _actually_ worth thinking about, because it is not "everyone else is doing it, mom!", it's something infinitely worse: "My bad money has driven the good money away so you _have_ to accept the bad money."

So what are the alternatives?

Well, there are a ton of places to intervene. The simplest is to apply MASSIVE pressure on the note holders to negotiate with the people who owe on the mortgage: either figure out a short sale, or refinance and record it correctly or whatever. The problem throughout the boom were lenders who blew through all the things that were supposed to catch the debris when things went bad on the loan: the mortgage didn't get registered wherever deeds and liens are supposed to be registered (some of the state offices got famously backed up) and sometimes it was assigned multiple times without any notification showing up at the registry (lots of reason to believe a lot of these assignments didn't even _try_). The thinking in the industry was some form of, everyone else is doing it/it'll be such a mess they'll never clean it up/chicken won't be coming home to my roost, etc.

When teetering edifices of credit or debt instruments have collapsed in the past, however, English and American law has never actually accepted this sort of explanation. We _did_ clean it up, legislatively, judicially, administratively or otherwise (please find me a counterexample! Please!). Usually, in the course of cleaning up the mess, new rules and regulations are promulgated, some designed to make things more efficient, some to make sure everyone actually documents everything in an effort to limit fraud and/or make it forensically detectable after the fact.

Which is why I'm fairly certain I can be forgiven for temporarily thinking mortgages! when thinking about bills riding around on horses. Some of those mortgages _were_ riding around on horses, and some of those mortgages were complete with straw buyers and multiple assignments -- just like the Livesey bills.

And I will leave for the next post mumble guarantors mumble.

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